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NOTES
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Until the 1890's it was common for oil and gas leases to run for
a specified duration, after which they would terminate if not con-
tinued by renewal. Ordinarily such leases were for long periods,
perhaps for fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years.1 Since the turn of
the century, however, leases of shorter duration have become cus-
tomary in the oil and gas industry.2 The craracteristic present day
lease runs for from sixty days8 to ten years and is perpetuated under
the habendum clause for an indefinite length of time thereafter if
either oil or gas is "found in paying quantities,"1 "produced,"5 or
"produced in paying quantities"' during the initial period. The
opening period specified by the lease is called the "fixed," "def-
inite," "initial" or "primary" term.
The courts are not at all uniform in their declarations of what
the lessee must do to continue his lease beyond the primary term.
It is common for authorities on gas law to tell us that in order to
extend the lease "there must be production."7 However simple this
may appear, a student of the subject will not find it helpful. The
'2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 288, p. 115 (Perm. ed. 1938); Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas, IV.
The Habendum Clause, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1921).
* Ibid.
' E.g., Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984 (1904).
4 Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Alford v. Dennis, 102 Kan. 403,
170 Pac. 1005 (1918); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984 (1904); Roach v.
Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
'Anthis v. Sullivan Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 86, 203 Pac. 187 (1921); Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla.
1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920).
6 Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669 (1922); Walden v. Potts, 194
Okla. 453, 152 P.2d 923 (1944).
'See 2 Summers, Oil & Gas § 298 at 133 (Perm. ed. 1938), "courts generally hold that produc-
tion within the definite term is necessary to extend the lease beyond it."
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habendum itself usually calls for "production" before extension, or
else the courts will often construe such words as "found" and "dis-
covered," when they are used in the habendum in place of the word
"produced," as being synonymous with "produced.",, Therefore, we
know from the beginning that "production" is required. The prob-
lem remains. The student still must determine what constitutes
"production" under the law of different states. He has yet to under-
stand which operations will, and which will not, extend the lease
after the specified term comes -to an end.
It is our purpose here to examine this problem in relation to
"shut in wells." A "shut in well" is one which is capable of giving
up oil or gas, but which is not being operated, often because there is
no pipe line or other market. Will the presence of such a well on
leased property at the end of the primary term qualify as "pro-
duction" under the habendum clause so as to carry on the lease?
If so, how long may this extension continue without the actual
marketing of oil or gas from the property? What are the rights and
duties of the parties while the lease is extended in this manner?
For a simpler analysis, we may distinguish four distinct circum-
stances under which shut in wells may play a part in the continu-
ation of a lease. They are (a) where oil or gas is marketed during
the definite term and the wells are subsequently shut in; (b) where
oil or gas is discovered but not marketed during the primary term;
(c) where unusual circumstances or lease terms extend the lease
and oil or gas is later discovered but not marketed; and (d) where
the primary term ends and, although there in nothing else to main-
tain the lease, discovery is made later. Let us consider these cat-
egories one at a time.
I. EXTENSION
A. Where Marketing Precedes the Shutting In
A Texas case has held that where active operations are fol-
lowed by a decline in well pressure such that the high-pressure
pipe line being used cannot carry the gas, a well may be shut in
until a new market is found if the parties have included shut in
royalties in their lease.9 In the absence of shut in royalties, another
Texas case' ° ruled that a temporary and unavoidable cessation of
marketing, as where a well's casing collapses and several months
pass before substitute wells are brought in, will not cause a forfeit-
ure of the lease. While the issue in such a case is not strictly one of
forfeiture, but rather is one of expiration under the habendum,
the decision nevertheless indicates that under such conditions the
lease will continue. The court, however, followed reasoning derived
from West Virginia authorities, and, as we shall see, Texas has not
generally adopted this view.
In Holchak v. Clark" Texas has maintained its view that only
marketing will qualify as "production" for the perpetuation of a
Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69
Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984, 985 (1904): "the lessees must actually find oil in paying quantities, and
this is the same as obtaining and producing it in paying quantities." Walker, The Nature of Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 Texas L. Rev. 483, 514 (1930). Contra, Texas
Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
u Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
10 Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
" 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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lease. The Holchak criticism of Texas cases deviating 2 from this
strictness implies that a temporary cessation of marketing will
terminate a lease in Texas if it occurs after the definite term. The
point is not entirely settled, however. The criticism in Holchak is
dictum, and the fact situation there is to be distinguished from that
in the case just cited.
Kahm v. Arkansas River Gas Co.'3 stated the Kansas position.
Here again a gradual depletion of well pressure after several
months of successful operations made it necessary to disconnect
the well from the only available pipe line, which carried gas only
under high presure. Although the Kansas Supreme Court intimated
that a temporary cessation of production would not terminate the
lease, it held that the lease must expire where further marketing
would require the prior development of new wells of sufficient
capability as to attract a new, low-pressure pipe line. From the
court's language, it would seem that the reasoning in this case is
analagous to that in an Oklahoma decision terminating a lease
where the only producing well was "plugged and abandoned." Even
though the circumstances were not identical, Kahm appears based
on the view that the permanence of the cessation is material. In so
holding, it is consistent with still another Kansas case, which term-
inated a lease where a well became depleted and the sole hope of
future profitability lay in further drilling and discovery.'
4
When wells ceased to surrender oil, but remained capable of
producing gas, although no market was available a 1931 Louisiana
decision terminated the lease involved."
On the other hand, a lease in Kentucky was held to have
remained in force for two years after the only active well had been
shut in.1 The closing of the well followed seven years of operation.
Lack of labor and materials during World War II had forced the
cessation. "Production," the Kentucky Supreme Court said, " ... is
not a continuing usage. Rather, it is a continuing possibility ... in a
situation of this kind.""
It is clear that in West Virginia a lease will not expire if the
wells are shut in after marketing has occurred unless it can be
shown that the lessee has not acted with due diligence. In Hutchin-
son v. McCue 1 it was said, "the lessee is entitled to an extension of
the term for 'as long as the premises are diligently and efficiently
operated, provided minerals shall have been discovered within the
fixed term.' "" Even though the court refused to extend the lease
in this case, it clearly did so by reason of its finding that the lessee
had not actively sought a new market.
" Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Texas Pac.
Cool & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
" 122 Kan. 786, 253 Pac. 563 (1927).
1"Jewett v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., 122 Kan. 287, 251 Pac. 1110, 1111 (1927):
"When the term had expired and the wells had become unprofitable, the lease was at an end.
Defendant was not entitled to hold it thereafter upon a possibility that they might find a deep gas
at some later time when they chose to drill for it."
'5 Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931): "where a well has ceased to be a pay-
ing proposition for anyone concerned, it has clearly ceased to produce gas in paying quantities."
"Locke v. Palmore, 308 Ky. 637, 215 S.W.2d 544 (1948).
" 215 S.W.2d at 545.




B. Where There Is Discovery, But No Marketing
During the Primary Term
Two strong lines of authority differently interpret the haben-
dum clause. Under the following section of this note, we will see
that Oklahoma, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Tennessee con-
strue the clause broadly. 20 Texas, Kansas and Louisiana have given
it a narrower construction.
The Broad Construction
Oklahoma. The two views may be found directly opposed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Bristol v. Colorado Oil and Gas
Corp.,21 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In this case, gas in paying plantities was discovered during
the primary term. For nine years thereafter, and seven and two-
thirds years after the end of the fixed term, the lessee was unable
to market the gas. A pipe line was at last obtained and the gas
marketed. The lessor brought action claiming the lease had expired.
Although shut in royalties had been paid each year according to
agreements made annually, they were not an issue in the case
because the lessor had refused to receive them for the last year. The
question was precisely whether the condition stipulated in the
habendum had been performed. The majority reasoned, consistently
with well established Oklahoma law, that no forfeiture results
where gas has been discovered in paying quantities during the
primary term and the lessee has acted with due diligence in
obtaining a market within a reasonable time. It was held that nine
years was a reasonable time. Although this may be seriously ques-
tioned, the decision clearly illustrates the legal principles espoused
by those courts which broadly construe the habendum.
Circuit Judge Huxman, in his dissent to Bristol,22 emphasized that
oil or gas must be brought to the surface and sold during the fixed
term. The only exception under which the lease may continue
without the active operation of at least one well, he said, is where
marketing has occurred during the definite term but has been tem-
porarily suspended to allow additional exploration. Only in this
event will "due diligence" and "reasonable time" become elements.
It would seem the majority were corrct in their statement of
Oklahoma law. In Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Ca.,23 the Oklahoma court
had cited the West Virginia case of Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan24 to
support a holding that a lease would continue beyond the primary
term if gas were discovered and cased off while drilling continued
to a lower sand. Parks stated that discovery in paying quantities
vests the lessee with a limited estate,2 which could not be lost by
the failure to market within the fixed term. It is interesting that
the court here cited the earlier case of Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas
0 This line of authority has received unfavorable treatment from some commentators. Summers,
supra note 1, § 300 at 144-48, has stated that these cases are probably based on equitable consid-
erations, but that it may be objected that conditions precedent to prolonging a lease must be
literally performed. Walker, supro note 8, at 518 makes substantially the same objection.
225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
225 F.2d at 898, 901.
2383 Okla. 295, 201 Pac. 517 (1921).
65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1904).
-This view is criticized in Summers, supra note 1, at 144, where it is argued that courts have
long held that the lessee gets a vested interest upon the very execution of the lease, and that there-
fore the West Virginia "vested interest upon discovery" doctrine offers no greater basis for extending
a lease than is present in other states, including those which narrowly construe the habendum.
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Co.,e which possibly could have been distinguished on the ground
that in that case the habendum called only for the "finding" of gas
in paying quantities and provided for a $100.00 royalty, which was
tendered by the lessee.
What is significant about the Oklahoma cases is that they have
followed the language of the West Virginia decisions. Nearly every
case in this area of oil and gas law may be distinguished from other
closely related cases on the facts and consequently the authority in
most states is incomplete since all conceivable fact problems have
not been adjudicated in each jurisdiction. It is often difficult to find
authority directly in point. It follows, therefore, that an adequate
appraisal of each state's law requires an understanding of the
reasoning used the the few cases decided. When a court such as the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cites West Virginia authorities, 27 one may
feel reasonably sure that the habendum will more or less consist-
ently receive a broad construction. Those citing the weight of
authority in Texas, however, will adhere to the stricter interpreta-
tion.
West Virginia. In the West Virginia case of Barbour, Stedman
& Co. v. Tompkins,28 the court used the words "discovered in paying
quantities" interchangeably with "produced in paying quantities."
The good faith opinion of the lessee that he had discovered gas in
profitable amounts was considered sufficient to extend the lease,
even though no gas had been removed from the ground and mar-
keted. Perhaps the broadest statement of the West Virginia doctrine
is to be found in South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass.29 Here it was
asked "may we not, therefore, say the qualifying clause 'as oil or
gas is produced' really means 'as long as the premises are diligently
and efficiently operated, provided minerals shall have been dis-
covered within the fixed term?' ,,3 The West Virginia court stated
that a strict construction of the habendum would "inflict disastrous
losses upon diligent and honest lessees in many instances-a conse-
quence plainly not within the intent of either party."'1 Still other
opinions by the same court have made it clear that discovery during
the primary term will extend the lease unless the lessee clearly
abandons the property or forfeits by failure to develop it.2
Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, a dictum in Summerville v.
Apollo Gas Co. 33 states that discovery and production are synon-
ymous in that state. Although gas had never been sold from the
property, but a well had been completed during the primary term,
the court said "we do not find any denial that the well produced
1,000,000 feet of gas a day ... .-4 The payment of shut in royalties
w72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
"West Virginia authorities were cited in: Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 295, 201 Pac.
517, 519 (1921); Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934, 936 (1919).
2581 W. Va. 116, 93 S.E. 1038 (1917).
S71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1912).
30 76 S.E. at 967.
31 Ibid.
3Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836, 840 (1909): "Our cases seem clearly
to hold that discovery of oil or gas is alone sufficient to vest the right-a right, it is true, which
may be lost by abandonment, manifested by neglect to produce, or pursue the work of production
and further development." Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.E.
655 (1902).
"207 Pa. 334, 56 Ati. 876 (1904).
. 56 Atl. at 878 (emphasis added).
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had kept the lease alive, and so this statement is dictum, but it may
be considered some indication of the Pennsylvania position.
Tennessee. Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis" is a federal court
decision interpreting Tennessee law. It terminated a lease where
nine years had passed since completion of a well and all efforts to
obtain a pipe line had failed, with no future prospect. The court's
rationale, however, was that a reasonable time had passed. From
this we may infer that the lease might not have expired if gas in
paying quantities had been successfully marketed within some time
less than nine years. We may note, also, that the court applied the
West Virginia rationale that discovery grants the lessee a vested,
though limited, estate in the property, whereas his rights are in-
choate before discovery.
Wyoming. The present writer has found scant authority for the
Wyoming position. In a 1924 decision, 6 the Wyoming court extend-
ed a lease covering property upon which gas had merely been dis-
covered, and not marketed, during the definite term. The lease con-
tained independent "marketing" and "producing" clauses, and from
this the court inferred that the parties had intended the habendum
clause, which required "production," to demand merely discovery,
but not the actual selling of gas. While discussing whether the lease
had been forfeited, as a separate problem from whether it had ex-
pired by its own terms, the court stated that discovery grants the
lessee a vested interest. This is most compatible with the West Vir-
ginia law.
Montana. Where gas is found within the primary term in what
would be commercial quantities if a market were present, and yet
no market is even prospectively available, an operator who has
shown diligence in his attempt to find a market is entitled to re-
tain his lease on that portion of the land on which the well is lo-
cated. The Montana court, in a 1936 case, ruled that under such cir-
cumstances the "gas well was 'producing' within the meaning of the
lease.37 According to the reasoning given, the well "producing" in
"legal contemplation" from the day the well was completed. The
Montana court criticized Elliott v. Crystal Springs, t a Kansas de-
cision terminating a lease in its entirety under virtually identical
circumstances, saying that it "is not in accord with the authorities
generally."'
The recent case of Fey v. A. A. Oil Corp.40 definitively places
Montana in line with the West Virginia authorities.
To say that they (the lessees) shall be declared in default
and to forfeit their lease if they do not market their product,
when there is at the time no profitable market, would be
contrary to equitable principles and to any express terms
of the lease. It would amount to saying, the defendants have
drilled a producing well which furnishes gas in market-
able quantities, but as there is no market the well is not
107 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1939).
"' Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Gross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 Pac. 570 (1924).
vSeverson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1936).
8 106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920).
w 6 3 P.2d at 1024.40 126 Mont. 552, 285 P.2d 578 (1955).
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producing. The contract is not reasonably susceptible to any
such interpretation.
4 1
In this case marketing arrangements were made after the fixed
term had ended.
As we shall see, those states which narrowly construe the haben-
dum clause would have held that the lease expired in each of these
cases.
Kentucky. Although interpreting the "unless" clause rather
than the habendum, Unity Oil Co. v. Hill42 indicates the Kentucky
alignment. The drilling of a well, without "shooting it," was held to
meet the requirement under this clause. A dictum, however, says
that "it (the well) was not . . . a producing well; that is, one from
which oil in profitable quantities could be taken.4 This tells us,
though admittedly without great force, that a well capable of giv-
ing up commercial quantities is considered a producing well in
Kentucky.
We may rely with greater assurance, however, upon Penna-
grade Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin.44 Here a well was completed dur-
ing the primary term but was shut in for two and one half years
until a pipe line was obtained. The Kentucky court held that the
lease had not expired, arguing that the lessee must be given a rea-
sonable time to market gas after its discovery.
Colorado. No authority is available for the Colorado position
on these matters.
(2) The Narrow Construction
Texas. The Texas line of authority, giving a narrow construc-
tion to the habendum, has been called the majority American
rule.
4 .
Certainly this is not clear from the case-law. Nevertheless, this con-
struction does have substantial backing. Perhaps it has received its
clearest expression in the following remarks from Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co. v. Barnhill:
Appellants did not contract for a term which would de-
pend upon the possibility of procuring a market for the
product at some date subsequent to its express date of ex-
piration. The lease did not provide that it should remain in
force and effect for five years, and as long thereafter as
there may be prospects of a market for the product ... ,
The facts in this case had shown discovery in paying quantities
during the primary term, followed by extensive efforts to find a
market. About one year after the fixed term ended, a market was
obtained. In such a case, the West Virginia court would have con-
tinued the lease.4 7 The Texas court did not.
Holchak v. Clark4 s another Texas decision, criticized the West
Virginia rule and two Texas cases following it.4 9 The court canceled
:" 285 P.2d at 587-88 (emphasis added).
2200 Ky. 577, 255 S.W. 151 (1923).
"255 S.W. at 152 (emphasis added).
"211 Ky. 137, 277 S.W. 302 (1925).
13 See note 7 supro; see alse, Walker, supra note 8 at 517 where the West Virginia rule is eval-
uoted as being "a minority group of cases which hae placed a Ibieral construction upon the
hobendum clause .... "
44 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Cir. App. 1937).
"- See South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1912).
4" 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Cir. App. 1955).
4. See note 12 supra.
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a lease where a favorable drill stem test had shown oil in paying
amounts and an active well had been completed after the primary
term. "One cannot say that discovery of oil followed by diligent
operations is the equivalent to production of oil and gas in paying
quantities, without doing violence to the plain meaning of words in
common use . . . Production has a commercial connotation.
'50
Holchak is careful to add, however, that the parties could, by spe-
cial provision, provide for such a circumstance. Later in this note,
in the section dealing with shut in royalties, we will discuss how
this might be done.
Dicta in Morrison v. Swaim"' further support the Texas rule.
Oil had been discovered during the primary term. Just the same,
the Texas court said "the well in question did not occupy the status
of a producing oil well... ,,52 The lease would have expired had not
drilling extended it under a special form of the habendum clause,
which provided for extension for as long as good faith drilling
operations continued.
A very recent case, Sellers v. Breidenbach,3 has reaffirmed
these Texas interpretations. Sellers repeated the rule that in
Texas a shut gas well will not extend a lease in the absence of a
shut in royalty provision. It also distinguished the West Virginia
rule from that which is predominant in Texas.
Only oversimplification, however, would lead us to state that the
Texas position has been clearcut. There has been considerable dif-
ference of opinion in that state. Primarily because of the Sellers de-
cision, which is the most recent, Texas' position appears clearly de-
fined. The cases to the contrary, although too common to be insig-
nificant, are not the weight of authority there. One of the contrary
cases, Cox v. Miller," argued that the gas must be marketed with-
in a reasonable time and that there must have been "a reasonable
expectation and probability of a market for the gas at the time
the well was completed"5 in order for the lease to extend. Since
the facts indicated that no market was even prospectively avail-
able, the lease expired. The Cox reasoning would clearly have ex-
tended the lease if a market had been fairly well assured. A nar-
row construction of the habendum clause would not have led to
this implication, nor has it done so.56
In Mitchell v. Perkins5 7 a lessee was given a reasonable time to
market the product of a well even if the fixed term expired be-
fore the time had elapsed. "It is elementary," the court said, "that
where gas or oil is discovered within the primary term, the lessee is
entitled to a reasonable time within which to market the same."58
A 1955 Texas case from the Court of Civil Appeals also held that
where a lease does not provide for shut in royalties and gas is dis-
covered in paying quantities during the fixed term "the lessee
50 284 S.W.2d at 401.
5-220 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
Id. at 495.
r 300 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"' 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
55 Id. at 327.
"
8
See Home Royalty Ass'n v. Stone, 199 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1952) (Kansas law held to terminate
lease even though the parties stipulated that gas had been marketed within a reasonable time after
the primary term).
5' 266 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex.
368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
58 Id. at 454.
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should have a reasonable time to market the gas, even though the
time required should extend beyond the primary term,"5 if a mar-
ket is readily available. The lease expired when due diligence
was not shown by the lessee. This case, Union Oil Co. v. Ogden,6o
is in line with Mitchell v. Perkins and Cox v. Miller. These three
cases would seem clearly to establish an exception to the severity
of the "Texas rule." They may well be established Texas law over
the long run. Decisions in other states accustomed to construing the
habendum narrowly are in opposition, however."
Holchak v. Clark, supra, has criticized the language in Texas
Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton,'2 where an habendum calling for
both discovery and production was interpreted to require only dis-
covery in paying quantities, and not marketing, in order to extend
the lease. Since "discovered," "found," and "produced" are generally
held to mean the same thing the Bratton case may possibly offer
some authority, though slight, for cases arising under differently
worded habendum clauses. It should be noted, however, that the
court seeed to assign a separate meaning to the word "discovered,"
thereby vitiating somewhat Bratton's usefulness for analogy. In
any event, the case is in direct alignment with those decisions which
have broadly construed the habendum, and as such is contrary to
the main .course of Texas rulings.
Other states -which have narrowly construed the habendum
where gas has been discovered but not marketed during the primary
term are Kansas and Louisiana. In some states, such as New Mexico,
there is little basis for distinct classification, if in fact classification
of them is possible.
Kansas. In 1920, the Kansas Supreme Court 64 held a lease to
have expired where paying quantities were found during the def-
inite term but where there was no prospect of obtaining a pipe line
of the necessary pressure. Twelve years later, Ratcliff v. Gouinlock 5
terminated a lease for the mining of clay. Although clay of the
proper sort had been discovered within the primary term, it had
not been mined until one month afterward. Reasoning by analogy
from oil and gas lease problems, the court overrode the lessee's con-
tention that where a well or mine is substantially completed during
the fixed term, equity maintains the lease. Rather, it is stated that
in oil and gas law it is, "necessary that there should be actual pro-
duction of oil and gas, not merely exploratory activities in order to
extend the term of the lease."6 While the words "actual production"
are ambigious, it is clear that the lessee could have gained an exten-
sion only by taking clay from the mine during the initial period of
the lease.
5278 S.WJ2d at 249.
60 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
61 See note 56 supra; Ratcliff v. Gouinlock, 136 Kan. 149, 12 P.2d 798 (1932) (terminated mining
lease where active extraction of clay began a month and a half after the primary term ended).
82239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
82 In Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1922), the court held that
"found" means "discovered and produced in paying quantities within the term named in the lease."
It was said in Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984, 985 (1904), that even
though the habendum speaks only of finding oil, "the lessees must actually find oil in paying
quantities, and this is the same as obtaining and producing it in paying quantities." See Walker,
supro note 8 at 514-15.
e' Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920).
82136 Kan. 149, 12 P.2d 798 (1932).
08 12 P.2d at 800.
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Two 1952 cases clearly express the Kansas law. Extensive dicta
in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.67 review the opposing construc-
tions of the habendum. The court concedes that, "there is a respect-
able contrary minority view in West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma,
Kentucky, Wyoming, and perhaps in a few other states." 68 But it
goes on to say that in its opinion "the great weight ou authority...
appears to be in harmony with the view that actual production dur-
ing the primary term is essential to the extension of the lease beyond
the fixed term." 9 Although the present writer has found it impos-
sible to substantiate this view of the weight of authority, the court's
emphasis, once again, on "actual production" (by which it ap-
parently meant "marketing") 'is clear.
The Tate decision is cited in the other 1952 case, Home Royalty
Ass'n. v. Stone.7 0 The issue, upon both fact and law, is here crystal
172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952).
w 240 P.2d .t 469.
% Ibid.
O 199 F.2c 650 (10th Cir. 1952).
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clear. Four days before the end of the primary term, a gas well was
completed with a daily potential of 10,514,000 cubic feet. The gas was
successfully marketed three months later, and the parties stipulated
that this was a reasonable length of time. The issue raised was
whether a lessee has a reasonable time to market gas after com-
pletion of a well with high potential even though the time might
extend past the expiration of the fixed term. The court held that in
Kansas no such opportunity is given. "There must be actual pro-
duction," it said, "as distinguished from exploration and dis-
covery .... -1
Louisiana. A lease was held to have expired by its own terms
in a 1933 case where the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that
"gas must be produced within the required time; that is, with-
drawn and reduced to possession for use in commerce.
' -3
New Mexico. The case of Town of Tome Land Grant v. Ringle
Development Co.73 offers an obscure guide to New Mexican law on
this subject. It does, however, give us some dicta. The New Mexico
court distinguished between leases which provide shut in royalty
and those which do not. Where there is no set consideration for the
lease, but merely a promise to develop with a hope of future royal-
ties "a lessee cannot be permitted to fail in development and hold
the lease for speculative purposes ... 14 This view Would seem com-
patible with both the West Virginia and Texas rules. Under the par-
ticular facts of the case, the lease was terminated by reason of the
lessee's lack of diligence during the primary term.
Summary. The preceding review of the case-law in several
states warrants the following generalizations, although strictly
speaking each state must be considered individually. In certain
states discovery of gas during the primary term will usually suffice
to extend the lease under the habendum clause if the gas is dis-
covered in paying quantities, the lessee shows due dligence in find-
ing a market, a reasonable time has not elapsed, and there is at
least a prospective market. Several other states will generally not
extend the lease under such conditions, but instead will require the
actual taking and marketing of gas from the well during the definite
term. Colorado has no authority and the New Mexico authority is
obscure.
C. Where Unusual Terms or Circumstances Extend the Lease,
and Oil or Gas is Later Discovered But Not Marketed
Even though oil or gas has not been sold in commercial quan-
tities during the fixed term, unusual clauses or circumstances3 may
extend the lease. This may occur, regardless of the state's tendency
to follow either the West Virginia or Texas rule. For example, where
habendums have provided that a lease is to remain in effect so long
as oil or gas is produced or good faith drilling operations are con-
tinued, courts interpreting Kansas 76 and Texas77 law have extended
71 199 F.2d at 652.
Pace Lake Gas Co. v. United Carbon Co., 177 La. 529, 148 So. 699, 701 (1933).
"56 N.M. 101, 240 P.2d 850 (1952).
4 240 P.2d at 852.
'sSee Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920), where the conduct of the parties was
held to be such as to show that they did not consider the lease terminated by failure to market the
gas within the primary term.
Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948).
Morrison v. Swaim, 220 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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the lease even though there has been a mere discovery of oil, if
drilling operations have continued beyond the fixed term. A Wyo-
ming decision78 extended a lease on the ground that separate
"marketing" and "producing" clauses indicated that the parties in-
tended to restrict the word "producing" in the habendum clause to
mean discovery in paying quantities. In Montana, a lease which pro-
vided that no royalty was to be paid on shut in wells which were
closed due to lack of a profitable market was extended on the
ground that this language had shown that the parties "contem-
plated the possibility of a well capable of producing . . . and the
possibility that there would be a market for it." 9 In another Kansas
case,80 a separate drilling clause, which allowed extension if drilling
were diligently carried through to paying production, was held to
have sufficiently modified the habendum as to allow extension.
The parties may agree to an extension of the primary term
beyond the date they have originally set. By so doing, the entire
lease may be kept in force even though gas has merely been dis-
covered, and not marketed, during the original lease term, accord-
ing to a Texas decision."' A lessee lost his lease to a subsequent good
faith lessee in such a case in Ohio,8 2 however, where he failed to
record the renewal agreement. The Ohio court ruled that the
renewal was in fact a new lease, and as such would have to be
recorded as provided by Ohio statute.
Estoppel will sometimes be present to keep the lease in force.
A lessor in Kentucky 83 was precluded from claiming the expiration
of a lease after he had knowingly acquiesced in the lessee's good
faith drilling of wells following the end of the definite term. The
estoppel doctrine has also been asserted in this connection in Louis-
iana.1
4
Stipulated rentals. There have been a number of cases in
which a lease has continued where only a shut in well has been
present and the lessor has been paid a stipulated rental or fixed
royalty in accordance with lease provisions to that effect. If such a
rental is the only royalty provided for in the agreement, the lessor
has in fact very little interest in whether a well is shut in or is
active.8 5 The rule is different, however, where the lessor is entitled
to royalties in excess of the fixed rental.8 In this event, the rules
discussed at length in the previous sections of this note apply.
7s Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 Pac. 570 (1924).
" Steven v. Potlatch Oil & Refining Co., 80 Mont. 239, 260 Pac. 119, 122 (1927).
'0 Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952).
81 Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
8a Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. City of Tiffin, 59 Ohio St. 420, 54 N.E. 77 (1899).8 
Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669 (1922).
"Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926). Although the lease was canceled
an other grounds, the lessor was held to be estopped from claiming forfeiture due to the lessee's
failure to drill during the twelve month initial period where the lessor had acquiesced in drilling
after this time had elapsed.
88Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 F. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Summerville v. Apollo Gas Co.,
207 Pa. 334, 56 Ati. 876, 878 (1904): "It may be that for some time the lessee was not able to
find a purchaser for the gas, but that was not the affair of the lessors. They were not interested in
the proceeds of the sale of the gas. Their rights under the agreement extended only to the receipt of
a stipulated annual rental for each well, and the free use of gas for domestic purposes. Beyond
this, the question of whether or not the quantity of gas was profitable was for the decision of the
lessee." McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 135 S.E. 238 (1926); see also dicta in
Town of Tome Land Grant v. Ringle Development Co., 56 N.M. 101, 240 P.2d 850 (1952) and Cox
v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
5' Lowry v. Philadelphia Optical & Watch Co., 161 Pa. 47, 28 Att. 1004 (1894); accord, Benedum-
Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1939); Smith v. Sun Oil Co. 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15
(1931); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
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Shut in Royalty Clauses. While terminating a lease in accord-
ance with the Texas construction of the habendum clause, the
Texas court in Sellers v. Breidenbach87 mentioned that the parties
could have kept the lease alive had they made explicit provision for
shut in wells. How might they have done so? What sort of provision
would have this effect?
A relatively new type of clause now in common use 8 is the"shut in royalty clause." One form is:
If while this lease is in effect, oil or gas be discovered on
said land which cannot be profitably produced for lack of
a market at the well or wells, lessee may pay lessor (a stipu-
lated sum) as royalty for each such well .. . and while such
royalty is so paid, such well or wells shall be considered as
producing in commercial quantities for all purposes here-
under.8 9
At least one form does not provide, as this one does, that the
payment of the royalty will suffice to class the well as a producer
of paying quantities. Under this type of provision, it may be neces-
sary to show that the well has a paying potential.90
Several Texas decisions have extended leases under such
clauses. 9' The leases would have expired otherwise. In Freeman v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 92 however, the presence of the clause did
not achieve extension of the lease where the royalty was tendered
four months after the primary term had ended. The royalty must be
paid during the primary term if the lease is to be extended. The
clause gives the lessee an option: he may pay the royalty and gain
extension, or not pay it and see the lease expire.9 3 It creates no
obligation.
D. Where the Primary Term Ends with Nothing to Sustain
the Lease and Oil or Gas is Discovered Thereafter
In Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan," a West Virginia case, a lease
continued in force when gas was found in paying quantities during
the fixed term and the lessee drilled deeper, finding a great quan-
tity of gas in the lower sand shortly after the fixed term ended. The
K 300 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
w8 Scurlock, Practical and Legal Problems in Delay Rental and Shut-in Royalty Payments, Fourth
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Low and Taxation 17, 37 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1953).
8 Union Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
0o Scurlock, supra note 88 at 45.
"Union Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Moriss v. First Nat'l Bank, 249
S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ .App. 1946).
0 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
WUnion Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
N 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909).
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extension was explicitly attributed to the first of the two dis-
coveries. Just the same, the court remarked that equity would have
kept the lease alive even if the only discovery had been after the
lease period had elapsed. A lessee who makes a good faith effort
to complete a well during the primary term will, according to this
dictum, be protected in West Virginia. Whether the other states
broadly construing the habendum will follow this precedent is, of
course, conjectural. It is clear that Kansas, Texas and Louisiana
will not.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES UNDER
AN EXTENDED LEASE
It has been stated that extension of a lease has the same effect
upon covenants to develop as would a new lease with immediate
possession.95 The implied covenants to develop the property continue
as before." These covenants are, however, just as the primary term,
subject to the "reasonably prudent operator" test, which demands
only that the lessee develop the land where it would be prudent
to do so. He need not extend drilling where there is insufficient indi-
cation that such activity would be profitable," although in Cosden
Oil Co. v. Scarborough"' the court cautioned that development may
not be postponed indefinitely. McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co.9
excused a lessee from drilling more than one well while no market
was available. But Severson v. Barstow00 emphasized that the
lessee must be reasonably diligent in his efforts to obtain a market.
III. CONCLUSION
A shut in gas well will extend a lease beyond the primary term
if a shut in royalty clause so stipulates, the lessor is estopped from
denying extension, unusual terms are present to modify the haben-
dum clause, or the habendum as such is given a broad interpreta-
tion. While the overwhelming majority of cases require "produc-
tion" to satisfy the ordinary habendum clause, 01 there is a split
among the states as to what constitutes "production." The weight
of authority in cases directly in point would seem to be that dis-
covery in paying quantities during the fixed term is sufficient. This
is the West Virginia rule, which is followed by a number of other
states, as related in detail above. On the other hand, some states
narrowly construe the habendum and will not extend a lease in
most cases unless either oil or gas has been taken from the ground
and sold in commercial quantities. There is no Colorado authority
on this subject. When a lease is extended, the usual implied cove-
nants to develop continue, but are subject, as during the fixed term,
to the "reasonably prudent operator" test, which may limit the
lessee's obligation if no market is available.
mTibbeus v. Clayton, 288 Fed. 393, 400 (E.D. Okla. 1923): "It is immaterial whether you call it
an extension or renewal."
e In Sander v. Mid-Continent Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 279 (1934), the Court said: "It is conceded
that a covenant on respondent's part to continue the work of exploration, development and produc-
tion is to be implied (sic) from the relation of the parties and the object of the lease; and that this
covenant was not abrogated by the exp:ration of the primary term of ten years." (emphasis added).
Robinson v. Miracle, 146 Okla. 31, 293 Pac. 211 (1930); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va.
531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909). See also, Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932) (dictum).
5' Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, supra note 96; Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39,
188 Pac. 1069 (1920).
See note 96 supro.
ul 102 W. Va. 345, 135 S.E. 238 (1926).
50 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022 (1936).
101 See note 7 supra.
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